Trade remedies – Examining the growing trend of non-imposition by the Ministry of Finance

Introduction

India’s trade-remedy framework is designed to protect domestic industries from the adverse effects of unfair trade practices such as dumping and subsidized imports. The framework operates through a two-stage process. First, the Directorate General of Trade Remedies (‘DGTR’), department under the Ministry of Commerce (‘MoC’) functioning as the investigating authority, conducts a detailed quasi-judicial examination to determine whether dumped or subsidised imports have caused material injury to the domestic industry. Upon recording affirmative findings, the DGTR recommends the imposition of anti-dumping duties (‘ADD’) or countervailing duties (‘CVD’).

The second stage involves implementation by the Central Government through the Ministry of Finance (‘MoF’). While the DGTR’s role is investigative, the final authority to impose duties rests with the Central Government, particularly the MoF.

For decades, this framework functioned with a high degree of consistency. Affirmative final findings by the DGTR were almost invariably followed by corresponding notifications issued by the MoF with some exceptions. However, recent years have witnessed a discernible shift, with an increasing number of affirmative findings not resulting in the imposition of duties. This development has emerged as one of the most significant trends in India’s trade-remedy regime.

The emerging trend of non-imposition

The changing implementation pattern is reflected in both historical and recent data. Available records show that between 1991 and mid-2020, approximately 99.5% of DGTR anti-dumping duty recommendations were implemented. The period following 2020 to 2022, however, witnessed a significant increase in non-implementation rates, with certain periods recording substantial divergence between DGTR recommendations and the ultimate actions taken by the MoF.

Particularly notable was the recent period between November 2025 and April 2026, during which the rejection or non-implementation ratio reportedly reached approximately 81%. This represented a sharp departure from India’s long-standing practice of routinely implementing affirmative recommendations.

The trend did not end there. An examination of final findings issued in March 2026, the imposition of duties for which was due by end of June 2026, further reveals that the DGTR recommended duties in a large number of investigations after recording findings of dumping/subsidisation, injury, and causal link. However, duties were ultimately imposed in only a limited number of cases. The cases in which duties were imposed are set out in Table 1 hereinbelow:

Table 1 – Investigations in which duties were imposed (final findings March 2026)
SN	Investigations	Subject Product
1	CVD (SSR)	Textured Tempered Glass from Malaysia
2	AD (SSR)	Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Resin from China PR
3	AD	Sulphenamides Accelerators from China PR, European Union and the United States of America

In contrast, affirmative DGTR recommendations which did not culminate in duty notifications by the end of June 2026 due to passing of the statutory deadline in a significantly larger number of investigations are provided in Table 2 hereinunder:

Table 2 - Investigations where affirmative findings did not result in duty imposition (Q1 2026)
SN	Investigations	Subject Product
1	AD (SSR)	Faced Glass Wool from China PR
2	AD	4, 4 Diamino Stilbene 2, 2 Disulphonic Acid (DASDA) from China PR
3	AD	Elastomeric Filament Yarns from China PR and Vietnam
4	AD	Flexible Slabstock Polyol from China PR and Thailand
5	AD	Liquified Natural Gas Fuel Tank LFT from China PR
6	AD	Beta Naphthol from China PR
7	AD	Nylon Filament Yarn from China PR and Vietnam
8	AD (SSR)	Flexible Slabstock Polyol from Saudi Arabia
9	AD	Viscose Rayon Filament Yarn (VFY) above 75 deniers from China PR
10	AD	Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC) Paste Resin from European Union and Japan
11	AD	2,2,4-Trimethyl-1,2 Dihydroquinoline’ (TDQ) from China PR
12	AD (SSR)	2 Ethyl Hexanol from European Union, Indonesia, Korea RP, Malaysia, Taiwan and United States of America
13	AD	Emulsion Styrene Butadiene Rubber of 1500 from the European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Thailand

Viewed collectively, the data indicates that during the March-June 2026 period, positive affirmative recommendations by the DGTR for duty imposition substantially outnumbered the cases in which duties were ultimately imposed. The implementation ratio during this period (19% of affirmative final findings culminating into imposed duty) stands in marked contrast to historical practice.

Additionally, several investigations concluded during May-July 2026 remain within the statutory implementation window (3 months from the date of publishing of the final findings, as per Rule 18 of AD Rules). The outcome of these cases is closely anticipated by stakeholders across affected sectors.

Historical practice and changing policy trends

Historically, India’s anti-dumping regime was regarded as relatively predictable. The near-universal implementation of DGTR recommendations provided certainty to domestic producers that findings of dumping, injury, and causal link would generally result in remedial action.

This predictability was an important feature of the system. Anti-dumping investigations are often lengthy proceedings involving significant participation by domestic producers, exporters, importers, and user industries. The expectation that affirmative findings would ordinarily be followed by implementation contributed to confidence in the effectiveness of the framework.

The developments witnessed after 2020 indicate a shift from this historical position. Recent implementation trends suggest that affirmative findings no longer necessarily translate into duty notifications. The continuation of this pattern beyond April 2026 further suggests that the trend cannot be viewed merely as a temporary departure but may reflect a broader evolution in implementation practices.

The data compiled from Gazette notifications for 2025-2026 and Q1 of 2026-27 indicates that the trend identified above did not subside after Q3 FY 2025-26. Rather, the pattern appears to have persisted into subsequent months, suggesting that the issue may be structural rather than temporary.

Such a shift has important implications for stakeholders. The effectiveness of any trade-remedy regime depends not merely upon the quality of investigations conducted by the investigating authority but also upon the implementation of the resulting recommendations. Where affirmative findings no longer provide a reasonable expectation of relief, the incentive for domestic industry to pursue trade-remedy investigations may gradually diminish.

The debate surrounding non-imposition

The growing divergence between DGTR findings and final implementation decisions has generated considerable discussion regarding the operation of India’s trade-remedy framework. Legally, the position is relatively clear. Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 contemplates separate roles for the investigating authority and the Central Government for antidumping duty. The DGTR is responsible for determining whether dumping, injury, and causal link exist. The final decision on whether to impose anti-dumping duty rests with the Central Government through the MoF. Further, Rule 18 of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995 (‘AD Rules’) also establishes that the imposition of duty has to be carried by the MoF before the expiration of 3 months from the date of publishing of the final findings.

Indian courts have also recognised this distinction. The statutory scheme does not make the imposition of duties automatic upon issuance of affirmative findings. Rather, the ultimate decision remains one of governmental determination.

The increase in non-imposition cases has therefore brought into focus the practical relationship between the findings of the investigating authority and the exercise of executive discretion in implementing trade-remedy measures.

The question naturally arises as to why an increasing number of affirmative DGTR findings are not resulting in duty notifications. Under the Customs Tariff Act and the associated rules, the MoF retains the final discretion in deciding whether to impose duties. Consequently, the MoF may consider broader public-interest concerns beyond the findings recorded by the investigating authority.

The reasons underlying non-imposition of duties in several recent cases are not always publicly articulated. While the MoF is not bound to accept every recommendation made by the DGTR, the absence of publicly stated reasons in cases involving affirmative findings of dumping, injury, and causal links makes it challenging for stakeholders to discern the considerations that influenced the final decision by the MoF. This has contributed to increasing calls for a more structured framework governing departures from DGTR recommendations.

Economic consequences of non-implementation

The implications of non-imposition extend beyond the immediate outcome of individual investigations. Trade-remedy proceedings involve substantial expenditure of resources by all stakeholders. Petitioning companies are required to provide extensive evidence regarding dumping, injury, market conditions, and causal link. Exporters, importers, and user industries similarly participate through questionnaires, submissions, and hearings.

Where an investigation concludes with affirmative findings but no resulting notification of duty, questions naturally arise regarding the efficacy of the remedial process. The issue assumes particular significance because many recent non-imposition cases involve products belonging to strategically important sectors such as chemicals, petrochemicals, specialty chemicals, polymers, fibres, packaging materials, and industrial intermediates. These sectors form important links within broader manufacturing value chains and represent substantial segments of India’s industrial economy.

Consequently, the significance of non-imposition extends beyond individual products and directly affects perceptions regarding the operation of India’s trade-remedy mechanism as a whole.

The estimated significant economic losses[1] (arising from the non-implementation of recommended anti-dumping measures and prolonged exposure to dumped imports can adversely affect domestic manufacturing ecosystems. Delayed implementation may discourage fresh investment, reduce capacity utilisation, and increase long-term reliance on imports.

The concerns become particularly relevant in sectors where domestic manufacturing capacity already exists, and substantial future investments are planned. Several products that have recently been the subject of affirmative findings fall within strategically important sectors.

Impact on MSMEs and domestic manufacturing

Many sectors recently affected by non-imposition decisions comprise a large number of domestic manufacturers, including small and medium-sized enterprises operating within broader industrial supply chains.

Investment decisions in such sectors are typically based upon long-term projections regarding market conditions, competition, and regulatory stability. While trade-remedy measures constitute only one element within the broader investment landscape, the predictability of the trade-remedy regime has traditionally been viewed as an important component of the overall policy environment.

Historically, domestic manufacturers could reasonably proceed on the basis that affirmative findings establishing injury from unfair imports would ordinarily be followed by implementation. The growing frequency of non-imposition decisions introduces a different dynamic, in which final implementation outcomes become less certain despite affirmative investigative findings.

As a result, recent developments have drawn increased attention from domestic industries seeking greater certainty regarding the practical operation of the trade-remedy framework.

In such circumstances, uncertainty regarding the implementation of DGTR recommendations may adversely affect investment planning. This may suggest that if affirmative findings are not consistently translated into remedial measures, investors may perceive heightened regulatory uncertainty.

Towards a more predictable framework

As instances of non-imposition increase, the importance of predictability within the trade-remedy system assumes greater significance. The effectiveness of any trade-remedy framework depends not only upon the quality of investigations but also upon the degree of certainty that stakeholders associate with the process. Domestic producers, importers, exporters, and user industries all structure their commercial decisions around expectations regarding regulatory outcomes.

A predictable framework does not necessarily require automatic implementation of every affirmative recommendation. However, consistency in the approach adopted at the final stage remains an important feature of a well-developed trade-remedy system.

The recent increase in non-imposition cases has therefore highlighted the growing importance of understanding how affirmative recommendations are ultimately evaluated and acted upon within the broader trade-policy framework.

This increasing divergence between DGTR recommendations and MoF decisions highlights the need for institutional clarity.

Several reforms may contribute to improved predictability, including:

1. Adoption of a formal public-interest assessment framework.

2. Clear guidelines for evaluating downstream industry concerns and inflationary effects.

3. Greater alignment between trade-remedy policy and broader manufacturing and industrial objectives.

Such measures would preserve governmental discretion while enhancing transparency and confidence in the decision-making process.

Conclusion

The increasing incidence of non-imposition of duties despite affirmative DGTR findings represents one of the most significant developments in India’s trade-remedy landscape. For nearly three decades, implementation of DGTR recommendations was the norm, contributing to a highly predictable system. However, implementation patterns after 2020, coupled with the substantial number of recommendations that were not implemented between October 2025 and June 2026, indicate a clear departure from historical practice.

While the MoF retains the statutory authority to decide whether duties should ultimately be imposed, the growing divergence between affirmative findings and implementation outcomes has become a defining feature of the contemporary trade-remedy regime.

As additional investigations completed during Q1 of 2026 approach the expiry of their implementation periods, stakeholders across industry, government, and the trade-remedy community will continue to closely monitor whether the recent pattern of non-imposition becomes an enduring feature of India’s trade-policy landscape or merely a transitional phase in the evolution of the country’s trade-remedy framework.

[The authors are Partner and Associate, respectively, in International Trade & WTO practice at Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan Attorneys, New Delhi]

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[1] Calculated an estimation at per investigation basis by taking the imports of the subject goods during the POI and multiplying it by amount of duty as recommended in the respective affirmative final findings. This provides a calculation of estimated loss in revenue in the form of duties collected, due to non-imposition of duties.