Signing is not always issuance: Examining the limitation requirement under GST

Limitation is an important aspect in tax litigation. Adjudication proceedings in tax are tied to an outer time limit, for each assessment year. Under the GST regime also, Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, 2017 prescribe the time limit within which the adjudicating authority is required to pass the order. An interesting question in this regard recently came up before the Calcutta High Court[1].

In this case, the proper officer digitally signed an order on 30 April 2024, which was the last date to pass order under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017. The said order, though signed on the last date (30 April 2024), was communicated to the assessee only on the next day (1 May 2024), when summary of the said order (DRC-07) was uploaded on the GST portal.

The assessee approached the High Court challenging the said order as time barred. It was assessee’s contention that since the order was uploaded only on 1 May 2024, i.e., one day after the expiry of the limitation period, it is barred by limitation.

After examining relevant provisions (Sections 73 and 169 of the CGST Act), the High Court observed that there are three distinct stages in the adjudication process: (i) making of the order, (ii) issuance of the order, and (iii) communication of the order. The High Court emphasised that Section 73(10) of the CGST Act provides that the proper officer ‘shall issue’ the order within the prescribed time limit, whereas Section 169 of the CGST Act deals with its communication/service. Thus, for the purpose of Section 73 of the CGST Act, the limitation period is concerned only with the issuance of the order and not with its subsequent communication or service.

The High Court also noted that the earlier tax statutes (Finance Act, 1994, Central Excise Act, 1944 and the old Income Tax Act, 1922) used the word ‘serve’ for the purposes of limitation. Thus, the words ‘serve’ and ‘issue’ were used interchangeably. However, GST law has moved away from the language used in the earlier tax regime and tied limitation to ‘issuance’ of order and not its service/communication. 

The High Court thus concluded that an order digitally signed within the prescribed period would not become time-barred merely because it was communicated to the assessee on a later date.

Analysis

The afore-discussed decision is premised solely on the fact that mere issuance of detailed order is sufficient compliance with Section 73 of the CGST Act. On this premise, the High Court held that the detailed order, if signed within the prescribed limitation, cannot be considered as time barred even if its summary is issued after the prescribed time limit.

Another aspect which is worth examining is the fairness and transparency in ‘issuance’ of orders. In the case before the High Court, the detailed order was digitally signed by the proper officer which made it possible to ascertain the precise date & time when such order was actually signed/issued. However, as is seen in various cases, detailed orders usually bear physical signature. Besides, as detailed orders are to be followed/accompanied by mandatory form (DRC-07) bearing reference number, such orders also do not bear DIN[2]. In such circumstances, even if an order is signed backdated to cover time limit, the assessee may not have any independent mechanism to ascertain when the order was actually issued/signed. Thus, the interpretation adopted in this decision may run the risk of rendering the entire adjudication process opaque. 

In context of this decision, it may also be relevant to analyse when the time limit to file appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act begins. Notably, Section 107(1) of the CGST Act provides that an appeal may be filed within three months from the date of communication of the order. Notably, ‘issuance of order’ is different from ‘communication of order’. Thus, the time limit for filing an appeal against an adjudication order will not commence unless such order is duly communicated to the assessee by any of the modes prescribed under Section 169 of the CGST Act. 

[The authors are Partner and Legal Intern, respectively, in Indirect Tax practice at Lakshmikumaran & Sridharan Attorneys, New Delhi]

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[1] M.M. Motors & Anr. v. Senior Joint Commissioner of Revenue, Berhampore Circle, WBGST & Ors. – 2026 (7) TMI 984.

[2] Circular No. 249/06/2025-GST